It is likely that when someone comes across fake news, it is very difficult for them to realize that it is fake. And Russia plays with that, for example; It does so through what is already known as False Facade: a way to ‘sneak’ news about the European UnionNATO, Ukraine or its Western allies copying the views of the media and passing off these fake news as true through his appearance. It is the result of the investigation carried out by the Strategic Communication Headquarters of the Foreign Action Service of the EU and the Department of Homeland Security, and whose conclusions he has had access to 20 minutes.
The EEAS, together with the Spanish authorities, detected suspicious activity on the Internet and proceeded to analyze a series of suspicious websites that were dedicated to creating and disseminating pro-Kremlin content with the aim of undermining Western support for Ukraine. “What we found was a network of at least 23 websites with ties to Russia that posed as Western media outlets. These sites take pro-Kremlin content from state-controlled Russian media or various pro-Kremlin social media accounts and repackage it to target EU audiences,” they explain. EUvsDisinfothe Union portal that is precisely responsible for explaining all situations related to the management of fake news.
How exactly does False Facade work? Russia uses a method called information laundering. In essence, it is take content from one source, repackage it into different formats and disseminate them through new channels. Information laundering is often used to hide the origin of the source or to reach a broader audience, or both.
There are three distinct phases in information laundering: placement, layering and integration. The False Facade focused on the stratification phase, which consists of disseminating the content initially placed through intermediaries to hide connections and obscure origins. This was done by two means. First, the websites automatically translated and republished content from state-controlled Russian media, removing any references to the original sources. In second place, They converted social media content into written articles.
The research is based on concrete examples. There is one regarding a YouTube video claiming that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky had bought a villa from King Charles III valued at more than £20 million. Next, an apparent means of communication, londoncrier(.)co(.)uk, used the content of the video to write an article about the story. And as if nothing had happened, this “news article” was picked up and amplified by state-controlled Russian media and Russian diplomatic accounts, and even the manipulative Pravda network(opens in a new tab), exposed by Portal Kombat.
Three very clear steps
“Of course, the claim was outright misinformation, and legitimate fact-checkers quickly exposed it as such. However, this example clearly illustrates the manipulative ecosystem created to allow the rapid spread of misinformation,” summarizes from the EEAS. “The three steps are very clear if we look closely”, they add, and warn that these maneuvers may pose a “more or less new” risk for the near future, especially if one takes into account that there is a month left for the European elections, but not only… since these maneuvers can also be used ahead of the elections in the United States next November. “This ongoing development underscores the need for greater vigilance and proactive measures to counter the potential impact of these manipulative activities,” they say.
In the report, of about twelve pages, reiterate that the initial placement of information involves one or more channels, laying the foundation for subsequent stages. That is, pro-Kremlin actors are capable of diversifying the ‘positions’ of these fake news. The layering process is then executed through one or several, often interconnected, intermediaries, which are often interconnected while eliminating the origin of the content.
Finally, integration occurs as the manipulator penetrates public discourse. Regularly, the integration phase of laundering is supported by conventional and legitimate media that collect the laundered information and amplify it even further. However, the EEAS and Spain explain, “the threat actors They aim to achieve methodical and repeated dissemination of the content on a specific audience in order to ensure its permanence in public opinion”.
Disinformation is one of the great obsessions of the European institutions with the 9-J elections so close, and they have been fighting against it for several years now. Putin’s Russia not only deploys bots on social networks, but also campaigns launched from the Kremlin itself or undercover agents in Europe who work for its interests. Moscow wants an unstable, manageable EU, the same one he expected to find when he launched the offensive against Ukraine; “But the reality has been the opposite,” insist senior officials in Brussels. It is that community ‘unity’ that Russia now wants to erode ahead of the elections.
To corral these movements, the European Parliament also has the Foreign Interference Commission (INGE), chaired by the French socialist MEP Raphael Glucksmann and of which the Spanish Javier Zarzalejos (PP) is vice-president. “We work to evaluate the level of these threats in different areas: major national and European elections across the EU; disinformation campaigns in traditional and social media to shape public opinion; cyberattacks directed against critical infrastructure; direct and indirect financial support and economic coercion to political actors and subversion of civil society,” explains the French leader. And yet, the Kremlin seems capable of adapting; This is like a game of cat and mouse and the EU seems ready to catch up with the Russian pussycat.
